













since	in	case	of	an	unfavourable	report	they	could	lose	the	company	as	a	client	(Comisión	Asesora	Presidencial	para	la	Seguridad	en	el	Trabajo,	2010).	This	recognition	suggests	that	private	WCBs	are	reluctant	to	circulate	information	that	would	risk	the	economic	relationship	held	up	with	their	client	companies.	It	hints	that	the	distribution	of	symbolic	resources	to	address	working	conditions,	ade-quate	equipment,	machinery	maintenance,	safety	regulations	and	risk	prevention	measures,	may	be	influenced	by	the	forces	of	the	market	place.	This	paper	aims	to	shed	light	on	this	communication	breach	by	examining	how	WCBs	produce	and	supply	informational	resources	and	goods	to	their	client	companies	to	prevent	work-related	in-juries,	diseases	and	 fatalities.	 Following	a	political	 economy	of	 communication	 framework	on	 the	Chilean	WCBs	sector,	 I	explore	the	relationship	between	WCBs’	 informational	resources	and	their	economic	process	of	exchange	within	a	neoliberal	context.	Free	of	governmental	‘impurities’	—e.g.,	regulations,	 supervision	 and	 enforcement—the	Chilean	 case	provides	 a	unique	 setting	 to	 explore	how	safety	information	is	shaped	by	economic	imperatives.	It	 is	particularly	instructive	insofar	as	being	able	to	reveal	how	the	power	of	the	free	market	influences	the	production	of	safety	informa-tional	goods	and	resources.	This	paper	aims	to	(a)	provide	a	well-grounded	theoretical	outline	 to	analyse	safety	information,	and	to	(b)	offer	a	glimpse	of	the	particular	kind	of	safety	informational	resources	and	goods	produced	under	neoliberalism.		
2.	WCBs	in	Chile	






Chile	bears	a	neoliberal	political	economic	order	since	the	70’s.	This	neoliberal	regime	was	imposed	via	Pinochet’s	violent	coup	d’état	backed	by	the	United	States	(Harvey,	2005).	By	exploiting	the	Chil-ean	population’s	state	of	shock,	Milton	Friedman	advised	Pinochet	to	impose	a	rapid	transformation	of	the	Chilean	economy,	what	Klein	(2007)	dubbed	a	‘shock	therapy’.	Freed	from	the	state,	this	eco-nomic	project	is	characterized	by	(a)	privatizations,	(b)	deregulations,	(c)	cuts	in	social	spending,	(d)	free	trade,	and	(d)	corporate	tax	cuts	(Klein,	2007).	Under	a	neoliberal	order,	the	state	resigns	of	its	productive,	distributive	and	regulatory	functions,	while	the	economic	logic	of	the	free	market	is	given	full	authority	to	organize	every	aspect	of	social	life.			Although	WCBs	in	Chile	were	implemented	before	Pinochet’s	neoliberal	state,	their	private	and	deregulated	traits	have	galvanized	since	then.	The	 ‘neoliberal	experiment’	that	took	place	in	Chile	(Klein,	2007)	had	the	power	to	severely	weaken	public	institutions	and	at	the	same	time	reinforce	those	agencies	like	WCBs	who	adhered	to	free	market	principles.	Thus,	the	neoliberal	state	was	not	a	setback	for	the	WCBs	sector	which	relied	mainly	on	private	participants	but	on	the	contrary	a	great	impulse.	In	this	regard,	the	public	WCB	was	not	set	aside.	It	was	allowed	to	continue	its	operations	in	order	to	receive	those	uneconomical	workers	that	private	WCBs	denied	to	provide	service	like	house	maids.		Chilean	WCBs	operate	fluently	and	comfortable	within	a	neoliberal	state.	These	institutions	em-brace	one	of	the	main	neoliberal	mottos,	the	power	of	the	free	market	to	regulate	the	economic	and	social	life.	Under	the	assumption	of	the	ability	of	the	market	to	self-regulate,	the	WCBs’	sector	relies	almost	entirely	on	economic	incentives	to	manage	health	and	safety	at	the	worksite.	With	almost	no	safety	regulations,	standards,	guidelines,	supervision	and	enforcement,	companies	are	left	to	regulate	themselves	on	the	basis	of	economic	stimuli.	There	are	no	more	than	32	general	labour	safety	and	health	 norms	 and	 331	 inspectors	 nationwide	 to	 supervise	 more	 than	 433.000	 corporations	(Comisión	Asesora	Presidencial	para	la	Seguridad	en	el	Trabajo,	2010).	On	the	basis	of	an	incremental	premium	in	case	of	fatalities,	injuries	and	diseases,	companies	are	encouraged	to	engage	in	the	im-provement	of	working	conditions,	maintenance	of	machinery,	provision	of	safety	training	and	deliv-ering	of	safety	personnel	equipment.	Following	a	neoliberal	reasoning,	companies	should	effectively	manage	workers’	health	and	safety	in	order	to	stall	or	diminish	their	financial	contribution.	In	addi-tion,	another	 free	market	assumption	 is	 that	 injuries,	diseases	and	 fatalities	would	decline	due	 to	WCBs’	competition	for	new	clients.	In	this	regard,	competition	would	push	WCBs	to	improve	their	research	and	technical	operations	in	order	to	lower	injury	rates	and	thus	increase	their	market	share	by	offering	cheaper	premiums.	To	sum	up,	free	market	safety	relies	on	the	premise	that	the	pursuit	of	economic	gain	naturally	encourages	companies	to	provide	a	safe	worksite	and	WCBs	to	improve	their	services.		
	




Workers’	health	and	safety	at	the	worksite	is	thus	highly	dependent	on	the	production	and	distribu-tion	of	WCBs’	symbolic	resources	such	as	risk	data,	accurate	indicators,	and	above	all,	high-quality	safety	knowledge.	Although	this	 is	not	something	hidden,	the	power	of	WCBs	in	shaping	workers’	consciousness	by	producing	and	circulating	information	is	only	known	to	insiders	of	this	sector.	In	this	regard,	I	claim	that	WCBs	constitute	a	cognitive	monopoly	on	health	and	safety.		In	addition,	WCBs	process	of	economic	exchange	is	an	informational	one.	This	constitutes	one	of	the	main	if	not	the	main	blind	spot	of	WCBs.	Contrary	to	common	sense,	WCBs	are	not	agencies	that	trade	medical	and	preventive	services	but	 insurance	companies	whose	main	product	are	 rates	 to	measure	 labor	health	 events	 in	 exchange	 for	 a	monthly	premium.	WCBs’	 central	 operation	 is	 the	transformation	of	work-related	fatalities,	injuries	and	diseases	into	informational	resources	—	e.g.,	injury	rate,	fatality	rate,	working	days	lost,	incapacity	rate	—	for	the	purpose	of	economic	exchange	(Finkelstein,	2015).	In	this	regard,	I	claim	that	rather	than	be	seen	as	providers	of	medical	and	pre-ventive	aid	WCBs	must	be	considered	in	terms	of	their	economic	process	of	exchange,	that	is,	insti-tutions	that	exchange	information	in	a	business	relationship.	Therefore,	WCBs’	symbolic	realm	must	be	addressed	within	the	logic	of	institutions	whose	economic	process	is	driven	by	the	dynamics	be-tween	client	companies	and	the	collection,	organization,	production	and	exchange	of	informational	resources.	In	addition,	WCBs’	symbolic	sphere	must	also	be	analyzed	in	their	complementary	process	of	assisting	client	companies	in	the	administration	of	rates	through	informational	goods.	WCBs	pro-duce	and	distribute	safety	knowledge	in	the	form	of	informational	goods	—	e.g.,	posters,	fliers,	bro-chures,	handbooks,	communication	campaigns	—	to	support	their	client	companies	in	exerting	con-trol	over	rates	and	premiums.	In	consequence,	the	examination	of	WCBs’	symbolic	production	has	to	be	done	by	framing	WCBs	as	an	information-intensive	sector	whose	main	economic	process	of	ex-change	includes	the	production	of	rates	to	swap	them	against	a	premium	as	well	as	informational	goods	to	manage	the	aforementioned	rates	and	thus	exert	control	over	the	cost	of	the	premium.		
	
5.	How	to	Theoretically	Approach	WCBs’	Information	

























Also,	by	following	Loss	Control	Management	(Bird	&	Loftus,	1976),	WCBs	support	companies’	inter-ests	by	framing	safety	as	an	economic	practice.	WCBs	promote	Bird	&	Loftus’	logic	of	reducing	acci-dents	by	decreasing	property	loss,	property	damage	and	productive	delays.	Under	this	perspective,	labor	accidents	are	redefined	as	‘incidents’	in	order	to	equalize	them	to	property	loss	and	damage	incidents	and	therefore	blend	them	together	under	a	productive	chain	of	management	control.	This	allows	companies	to	control	labor	accidents	and	diseases	in	line	with	their	production	processes	by	deleting	the	natural	conflict	between	safety	and	productivity.	WCBs	know	that	in	order	to	succeed	in	the	market	place	it	is	not	enough	to	produce	and	circulate	informational	goods	amenable	to	companies	but	to	extensively	promote	and	marketize	this	view.	In	this	 regard,	WCBs	engage	 in	propaganda	 favourable	 to	corporate	 interests	 in	order	 to	build	 their	brand	around	a	pro-corporate	appeal	and	imbue	themselves	with	an	attractive	business	image.	On	a	regular	basis	WCBs	promote	through	the	mass	media	what	they	call	a	‘safety	culture’,	a	series	of	cor-porate	messages	directed	to	the	general	public	on	how	to	achieve	health	and	safety	at	the	worksite.	This	‘safety	culture’	propaganda	is	saturated	with	pro-corporate	meanings	and	anti-workers’	myths	–	e.g.,	workers	as	unsafe,	ignorant	and	lazy.	Mainly,	these	messages	reinforce	both	the	displacement	of	 accidents’	 responsibility	 –from	 the	 organization	 to	workers–	 and	 the	 economic	 perspective	 of	safety.	On	the	one	side,	by	promoting	safe	attitudes,	safety	behaviours,	the	use	of	personal	protective	equipment	and	complying	with	the	organization’s	rules,	WCBs	install	the	hegemony	that	accidents	are	due	to	workers’	fault	rather	than	companies’	social	organization	of	work.	On	the	other	side,	by	linking	 safety	 to	 productivity,	 efficiency,	 property	 damage,	 savings	 and	 a	 good	 corporate	 image,	WCBs	establish	the	hegemonic	view	that	safety	is	as	an	economic	activity	to	be	pursued	in	line	with	companies’	economic	interests.	In	this	regard,	the	strongest	hegemony	promoted	by	WCBs	is	the	idea	that	 corporate	 and	workers’	 values,	 interests	 and	 priorities	 are	 one	 and	 the	 same.	 By	 constantly	meshing	corporate	interests	and	workers’	needs,	WCBs	create	the	notion	that	by	promoting	workers’	health,	companies’	interests	can	be	achieved	and	vice-versa.	This	hegemony	enables	WCBs	to	occlude	the	natural	conflict	between	corporate	interests	and	workers’	health,	an	issue	that	prominent	health	scholars	call	to	address	(Karassek	&	Theorell,	1990;	Siegrist,	1996).		
	
7.	Concluding	Remarks	




WCBs	fail	to	protect	workers	against	labor	hazards	by	producing	and	supplying	distorted	informa-tional	resources	and	pro-corporate	informational	goods.	The	effects	of	distorted	rates	and	pro-corporate	views	are	not	negative	to	everyone	as	it	might	appear.	The	impact	is	a	dialectic	one,	with	workers	as	losers	on	the	one	side	and	WCBs	and	corpora-tions	as	winners	on	the	other.	Since	workers	rely	on	WCBs	for	accurate	risks	information	and	high	quality	safety	knowledge	to	interpret	and	respond	to	labor	hazards,	the	production	and	circulation	of	distorted	and	corporate	friendly	information	harms	them	directly.	Workers	are	cognitively	misled	and	left	physically	and	mentally	unprotected	at	the	worksite.	On	the	one	hand,	distorted	low	rates	minimize	the	degree	of	risks	at	the	worksite,	and	on	the	other,	pro-corporate	safety	knowledge	oc-cludes	the	risks	of	the	social	organization	of	work.	Social	dimensions	of	health	such	as	excessive	de-mand,	low	control,	effort/reward	imbalance	and	lack	of	social	support	(Wilkinson,	2001)	are	com-pletely	neglected	and	left	apart.	Safety	misperception	as	an	inaccurate	mode	of	perceiving	hazards	at	the	worksite	arises	as	the	main	outcome	of	the	lack	of	accurate	informational	resources	and	goods.	Regarding	WCBs	and	their	client	corporations,	the	production	of	distorted	and	pro-corporate	infor-mation	is	convenient	for	both	of	them.	First,	distorted	rates	allow	WCBs	and	companies	to	maintain	a	supportive	public	opinion.	Low	rates	bring	legitimacy	to	WCBs	by	presenting	them	as	thriving	in-stitutions	and	give	prominence	to	companies	by	presenting	them	as	socially	responsible.	Second,	cor-porate	friendly	knowledge	aid	WCBs	and	companies	to	sustain	policies	hurtful	to	corporate	interests.	Since	pro-corporate	safety	knowledge	liberates	companies	from	their	responsibility	in	the	produc-tion	of	fatalities,	injuries	and	diseases	by	relocating	the	blame	on	workers,	companies	are	shielded	from	major	interventions.				To	conclude,	 it	 is	 important	 to	emphasize	 that	 this	communication	breach	 is	not	because	 the	right	to	high-quality	information	and	knowledge	is	absent	from	the	political	scenario.	Government	officials	are	well	aware	that	accurate	safety	information	is	vital	to	protect	workers.	The	dilemma	is	that	the	right	to	high-quality	safety	information	is	placed	in	subordination	to	other	rights.	As	Marx	precisely	stated,	human	rights	are	denied	when	rights	of	private	property,	capital	accumulation	and	market	exchange	are	given	primacy	(Marx,	1978).	In	this	case,	it	is	WCBs’	primacy	over	market	ex-change,	competition,	and	economic	interests	that	indirectly	deny	the	production	and	supply	of	accu-rate	rates	and	safety	knowledge.	The	refusal	to	high-quality	safety	information	is	a	result	of	WCBs’	economic	organization.	Therefore,	it	is	imperative	to	transform	WCB’s	economic	base	to	allow	the	production	and	distribution	of	safety	information	in	conditions	of	equity	and	liberty,	in	accordance	to	workers’	non-commercial	needs.			
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